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On the Conceptual and the Empirical 
A CRITIQUE OF JOHN MIKHAIL’S COGNITIVISM 
Dennis Patterson† 
INTRODUCTION 
This symposium was convened to consider the question 
of scientific truth. Of course, there are many questions one 
might ask about scientific truth. The most obvious question  
is whether “truth” names a property and, if so, what sort of 
property is it? If truth is not a property, then how are we to 
conceive of it? Is it a relation? If it is, between what things  
does the relation hold? Sentences or states-of-affairs are 
possible candidates. While important, these questions are best 
approached after one has addressed a more fundamental issue, 
that of the distinction between the conceptual and the 
empirical.  
In this Article, I will argue for two claims: First, there is 
in fact a distinction between conceptual and empirical 
questions. Second, conceptual questions are prior to (that is, 
they antecede) matters of truth and falsehood.1 The relation-
  
 † Board of Governors Professor of Law and Philosophy, Co-Director, 
Institute for Law and Philosophy, Rutgers University, School of Law (Camden); 
Professor of Jurisprudence and International Trade, Swansea University, School of 
Law, Wales, U.K. 
 1 Bennett and Hacker explain the empirical/conceptual distinction and its 
importance for empirical inquiry in the specific context of neuroscience.  
Conceptual questions antecede matters of truth and falsehood. They are 
questions concerning our forms of representation, not questions concerning 
the truth and falsehood of empirical statements. These forms are 
presupposed by true (and false) scientific statements and by correct (and 
incorrect) scientific theories. They determine not what is empirically true or 
false, but rather what does and what does not make sense. Hence conceptual 
questions are not amenable to scientific investigation and experimentation or 
to scientific theorizing. For the concepts and conceptual relationships in 
question are presupposed by any such investigations and theorizings. Our 
concern here is not with trade union demarcation lines, but with distinctions 
between logically different kinds of intellectual inquiry. . . . . 
Distinguishing conceptual questions from empirical ones is of the first 
importance. When a conceptual question is confused with a scientific one, it is 
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ship between the conceptual and the empirical is important 
because any empirical inquiry that proceeds from conceptual 
confusion cannot yield satisfactory results.  
After setting out the distinctions just outlined in Part I, 
I will illustrate my claims in Parts II-V with reference to recent 
work by John Mikhail on moral cognition. Just as Noam 
Chomsky hypothesizes a universal linguistic grammar to 
explain speech behavior, so too, Mikhail argues, we can explain 
the moral behavior of persons in terms of universal moral 
grammar” (“UMG”).2 I will argue that Mikhail’s claims on 
behalf of UMG suffer from conceptual confusions that are not 
amenable to empirical resolution.3 
I. THE EMPIRICAL AND THE CONCEPTUAL 
There is an important distinction between conceptual 
and empirical questions. Empirical assertions are claims of 
fact. They are tested by the methodology of science, that is, 
through experimentation. In the realm of cognition, neuro- and 
cognitive scientists test hypotheses about brain functions. To 
  
bound to appear singularly refractory. It seems in such cases as if science 
should be able to discover the truth of the matter under investigation by 
theory and experiment—yet it persistently fails to do so. That is not 
surprising, since conceptual questions are no more amenable to empirical 
methods of investigation than problems in pure mathematics are solvable by 
the methods of physics. Furthermore, when empirical problems are addressed 
without adequate conceptual clarity, misconceived questions are bound to be 
raised, and misdirected research is likely to ensue. For any unclarity 
regarding the relevant concepts will be reflected in corresponding unclarity in 
the questions, and hence in the design of experiments intended to answer 
them. And any incoherence in the grasp of the relevant conceptual structure 
is likely to be manifest in incoherences in the interpretation of the results of 
experiments. 
M.R. BENNETT & P.M.S. HACKER, Introduction to PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
NEUROSCIENCE 2 (2003). I discuss the importance of Bennett and Hacker’s critique of 
cognitivism in Dennis Patterson, Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience, NOTRE 
DAME PHIL. REVIEWS (2003), http://ndpr.nd.edu/review.cfm?id=1335 (book review). 
 2 John Mikhail, Universal Moral Grammar: Theory, Evidence and the 
Future, 11 TRENDS IN COGNITIVE SCI. 143, 143 (2007). A central claim Mikhail makes is 
that “the mind contains a moral grammar.” Id. at 144. Mikhail makes clear that his 
account of moral grammar is a “computational” theory. Id. at 143.  
 3 Mikhail claims that “further research is needed to clarify the relevant 
conceptual and evidentiary issues.” Id. at 148. I contend that more research will clarify 
nothing because the research program is fundamentally misconceived. I discuss these 
issues more broadly in Dennis Patterson, Fashionable Nonsense, 81 TEX. L. REV. 841 
(2003) (review essay discussing ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME E. BRUNER, 
MINDING THE LAW (2000); STEVEN L. WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE FOREST: LAW, LIFE 
AND MIND (2001); VINCENT DESCOMBES, THE MIND’S PROVISIONS: A CRITIQUE OF 
COGNITIVISM (Stephen Adam Schwartz, trans., 2001)). 
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take just one example, neuroscientists are particularly 
interested in correlating brain function with emotional and 
behavioral responses.4 Such work is thought to provide insight 
into the connection between the brain and behavior. 
Conceptual questions, on the other hand, involve 
matters of sense.5 They are not amenable to empirical assess-
ment, confirmation, or analysis. Conceptual relationships are 
presupposed by empirical claims. If there is conceptual 
confusion, then nothing of empirical value can obtain. The 
success of empirical inquiry depends upon conceptual clarity 
(that is, the absence of conceptual error or confusion).  
Some neuroscientists are not content with limiting their 
work to brain functions and have given in to speculation about 
the relationship between the mind and the brain. Consider the 
concept of “mind.” The question “what is mind?” or “what is a 
mind?” implicates a panoply of other concepts like “vision,” 
“understanding,” and “thought.” The question “what is mind?” 
is conceptual and not empirical because, among other reasons, 
no experiment could answer the question. An answer to the 
question “what is mind?” requires a different sort of reply than 
we give to the question “where in the brain does one find the 
medulla?” 
  
 4 A recent example is Dean Mobbs et al., Law, Responsibility, and the Brain, 
5 PLOS BIOLOGY 693 (2007), available at http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/ 
picrender.fcgi?artid=1852146&blobtype=pdf.  
 5 Bennett and Hacker explain the relationship of sense to truth thus: 
Cognitive neuroscience is an experimental investigation that aims to discover 
empirical truths concerning the neural foundations of human faculties and 
the neural processes that accompany their exercise. A precondition of truth is 
sense. If a form of words makes no sense, then it won’t express a truth. If it 
does not express a truth, then it can’t explain anything. Philosophical 
investigation into the conceptual foundations of neuroscience aims to disclose 
and clarify conceptual truths that are presupposed by, and are conditions of 
the sense of, cogent descriptions of cognitive neuroscientific discoveries and 
theories. If conducted correctly, it will illuminate neuroscientific experiments 
and their description as well as the inferences that can be drawn from them. 
In Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience we delineated the 
conceptual network formed by families of psychological concepts. These 
concepts are presupposed by cognitive neuroscientific research into the 
neural basis of human cognitive, cogitative, affective, and volitional powers. 
If the logical relations of implication, exclusion, compatibility, and 
presupposition that characterize the use of these concepts are not respected, 
invalid inferences are likely to be drawn, valid inferences are likely to be 
overlooked, and nonsensical combinations of words are likely to be treated as 
making sense. 
Maxwell Bennett & Peter Hacker, The Conceptual Presuppositions of Cognitive 
Neuroscience: A Reply to Critics, in MAXWELL BENNETT ET AL., NEUROSCIENCE AND 
PHILOSOPHY: BRAIN, MIND, AND LANGUAGE 127, 128 (2007) (footnote omitted). 
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Conceptual confusions arise in a variety of ways and can 
take several forms.6 Fundamentally, error can arise from 
failure to employ words in accordance with the rules for their 
use. But confusion can also arise in more complex ways. 
Professor Mikhail errs when he tries to locate moral knowledge 
in a “place,” that place being the mind. This form of conceptual 
error, I will argue, undermines Mikhail’s arguments for the 
explanatory power of UMG. 
II. MIND AND MORAL GRAMMAR 
Now to the more complicated subject of “mind.” What 
are the proper forms of expression for referring to “the mind”? 
To this point, I have endeavored only to make the point that 
the question “what is mind?” is not amenable to an empirical 
answer and that the answer it requires is bound up with rules 
for the use of words and expressions associated with our neural 
capacities. Now, I shall detail the central claims made by 
Mikhail on behalf of the theory of UMG before suggesting why 
these claims are conceptually confused. 
I start with what Mikhail identifies as the core 
questions for UMG before considering Mikhail’s key claims. 
These questions frame Mikhail’s inquiry into the nature of 
mind and delineate the central focus of his research into the 
relationship between mind and moral knowledge. He asks: 
1. What constitutes moral knowledge? 
2. How is moral knowledge acquired? 
3. How is moral knowledge put to use? 
4. How is moral knowledge physically realized in the brain? 
5. How did moral knowledge evolve in the species?7 
In describing the main features of our innate moral 
capacity, Mikhail makes a number of key claims about the 
nature of mind and moral grammar. These are: 
1. “[T]he mind contains a moral grammar . . . .”8 
  
 6 I discuss this topic in connection with philosophical naturalism in Dennis 
Patterson & John Oberdiek, Moral Evaluation and Conceptual Analysis in 
Jurisprudential Methodology, in LAW AND PHILOSOPHY 60-75 (Michael Freeman & Ross 
Harrison eds., 2007). 
 7 Mikhail, supra note 2, at 144. 
 8 Id. 
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2. “[T]he manner in which this grammar is acquired 
implies that at least some of its core attributes are 
innate, where ‘innate’ is used in a dispositional sense 
to refer to cognitive systems whose essential 
properties are largely pre-determined by the inherent 
structure of the mind . . . .”9 
3. Moral intuitions “are best explained by assuming 
[that individuals] possess tacit knowledge of specific 
rules, concepts or principles.”10 
I shall accept Mikhail’s claims about the nature of mind and, 
further, assume arguendo the truth of his claims about the role 
and function of moral grammar.  
Nevertheless, Mikhail makes at least two philosophic-
ally suspect claims about the relationship between mind and 
moral grammar. These claims hint at larger, more structural 
problems with UMG. These are the two claims: 
1. Moral knowledge is in the mind (brain);11 and 
2. Moral reasoning is a matter of unconscious applica-
tion/interpretation of rules, principles, and “domain 
specific algorithms.”12 
The first claim involves the locus of the mind’s tool for solving 
ethical problems. In the course of solving these problems, 
Mikhail argues, the mind accomplishes its moral computa-
tional tasks unconsciously. The second claim asserts that  
the mind’s methodology for tackling ethical problems is 
“interpretation.”13 
There are two problems with the idea that we can 
explain moral cognition with the claim that the mind follows 
rules by unconsciously interpreting their requirements in 
particular cases. The first involves the claim that to under-
stand what a rule requires we need to interpret it. The second 
  
 9 Id. 
 10 Id.  
 11 Id. (“[T]he mind contains a moral grammar.”). This grammar is “innate” in 
that its “essential properties are largely pre-determined by the inherent structure of 
the mind.” Id.  
 12 Id. at 148. Knowledge of these moral rules is “tacit.” Id. at 145. In solving 
ethical problems, “a pattern of organization . . . is imposed on the stimulus by the mind 
itself.” Id. The process of computation is “unconscious.” Id.  
 13 Mikhail puts it this way: “[H]ow the mind goes about interpreting these 
novel fact patterns, and assigning a deontic status to the acts they depict, is not 
revealed in any obvious way by the scenarios themselves.” Id.  
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involves the claim that “following a rule” is something a person 
does “unconsciously.” Neither of these claims makes sense; and, 
lacking sense, neither is amenable to empirical testing (that is, 
experiment). 
III. UNDERSTANDING AS INTERPRETATION 
Mikhail’s claim that we follow rules by interpreting 
them is one made in a wide variety of humanistic and social-
scientific disciplines.14 The problem with the claim is structural 
and conceptual. If understanding a rule first requires 
interpretation of it, then there is no reason why the 
interpretation itself does not similarly stand in need of 
interpretation. This process of interpretive regression can go on 
infinitely.15 Hence, the term “infinite regress” has been used to 
describe the argument against the idea that to be understood, 
rules must first be “interpreted.”16 This argument, however, is 
  
 14 For detailed discussion, see generally Dennis Patterson, The Poverty of 
Interpretive Universalism: Toward the Reconstruction of Legal Theory, 72 TEX. L. REV. 
1 (1993). 
 15 Wittgenstein made the point this way:  
“But how can a rule shew me what I have to do at this point? Whatever I do 
is, on some interpretation, in accord with the rule.”—That is not what we 
ought to say, but rather: any interpretation still hangs in the air along with 
what it interprets, and cannot give it any support. Interpretations by 
themselves do not determine meaning. 
LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS § 198 (G.E.M. Anscome 
trans., 1958); see also ROBERT B. BRANDOM, MAKING IT EXPLICIT: REASONING, 
REPRESENTING, AND DISCURSIVE COMMITMENT 508-09 (1994) (“Linguistic under-
standing depends on interpretation . . . only in extraordinary situations—where 
different languages are involved, or where ordinary communication has broken 
down.”); Jeff Coulter, Is Contextualising Necessarily Interpretive?, 21 J. PRAGMATICS 
689, 692 (1994) (“Understanding is not an activity: it is akin to an ability. To 
understand is to have achieved knowledge of some kind, whilst interpreting is an 
activity which is akin to hypothesis formation or, in a different sense, to the 
assignment of significance (explanatory or otherwise) broader than the determination 
of intelligibility.” (footnote omitted)). 
 16 Peter Hacker explains: 
[I]t is a grievous error to think that in understanding an utterance one 
always or even usually engages in interpretation. To interpret an utterance is 
to explain it, typically to paraphrase it in the same language or to translate it 
into a different language. . . . Obscurities, ambiguities or complexities may 
call out for an interpretation, but it would be wholly incoherent to think that 
all understanding is interpreting. For then the interpretation given, i.e. the 
paraphrase, would itself stand in need of an interpretation in order to be 
understood; and a vicious regress would be generated. This misconception 
has manifold roots. One is the bizarre idea that what we hear or utter are 
mere sounds which have to be correlated with or mapped on to meanings in 
order to be understood. But we no more hear or utter mere sounds than we 
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compressed: I shall spell it out in more detail, using 
Wittgenstein’s arguments regarding understanding and inter-
pretation to support my case.17 
Wittgenstein’s basic claim is that “understanding” is 
primary and “interpretation” a second-order or “parasitic” 
activity.18 Interpretation is parasitic in the sense that interpre-
tation only arises where understanding is already in place. 
Understanding, according to Wittgenstein, is unreflective 
action. When we follow rules, we do so without second-guessing 
ourselves and without reflection on what the rule requires.  
Wittgenstein begins his argument for the primacy of 
understanding by presenting us with a paradox. He writes:  
This was our paradox: no course of action could be determined by a 
rule, because every course of action can be made out to accord with 
the rule. The answer was: if everything can be made out to accord 
with the rule, then it can also be made out to conflict with it. And so 
there would be neither accord nor conflict here.19  
Why does Wittgenstein question the importance of interpreta-
tion as an explanation of meaning (that is, as an explanation  
of what it is to grasp the meaning of a rule or what the rule 
requires by way of correct action)? His point is that if the 
understanding of an utterance or sign were a matter of 
advancing an interpretation (which is just another utterance or 
sign), then the interpretation itself would require its own 
interpretation, and so on, infinitely. This argument—the 
infinite regress argument—is meant to inspire us to question 
the idea of understanding as interpretation. Wittgenstein urges 
us to rethink the notion that before we can understand an 
utterance we must first interpret it. According to him, under-
standing a rule is fundamental to our role as participants in 
practice. Interpretation, by contrast, is an activity we engage 
in when our understanding breaks down. 
Wittgenstein’s insight is that rule-following is not a 
mental phenomenon. Succinctly stated, Wittgenstein relocates 
normativity in action, specifically in social action. The 
  
see or paint mere patches of colour. We hear and utter meaningful words and 
sentences . . . . 
P.M.S. Hacker, Language, Rules and Pseudo-Rules, 8 LANGUAGE & COMM. 159, 168 
(1988). 
 17  For detailed discussion of the understanding/interpretation distinction and 
its relevance for law, see DENNIS PATTERSON, LAW AND TRUTH 86-88 (1996). 
 18 WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 15, §§ 139-242. 
 19 Id. § 201. 
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normativity of rule-following—the ground of correctness and 
incorrectness—is not to be found in the agreement of others as 
such. Rather, the agreement of rule-followers over time is the 
ground of understanding. Agreement is a necessary feature of 
the normativity of our practices, but the agreement must be a 
regularity in reaction to use. In short, when we say there must 
be “agreement in actions” what we are really saying is that 
there must be harmony in application over time.20 This 
harmony in reaction and application is constitutive of all 
practices, including legal practice. It is the basis of our legal 
judgments. 
The distinction between correct and incorrect rule-
following is a matter of community agreement in judgments 
over time.21 If Wittgenstein is correct, then the idea of 
unconscious rule-following is nonsensical. Following a rule, 
making judgments about what a rule requires, and the very 
idea of normativity itself require a role for others in the 
intersubjective constitution of norms of correctness. The 
Mikhail/Chomsky view of rule-following never gains traction 
because it never moves beyond the ground of the internal 
constitution of mind. 
  
 20 For discussion, see MEREDITH WILLIAMS, WITTGENSTEIN, MIND AND 
MEANING: TOWARD A SOCIAL CONCEPTION OF MIND 176 (1999).  
It is in this sense that community agreement is constitutive of practices, and 
that agreement must be displayed in action. There are two important 
features about this account that need to be highlighted. First, it is the 
social practice that provides the structure within which individual 
understanding can obtain or individual judgement be made. Central to 
Wittgenstein’s thought is the claim, repeatedly argued for, that no isolated 
event or behavior can correctly be described as naming or obeying or 
understanding. The rule as formula, the standard as chart, or the paradigm 
as an instance have no normative or representational status in their own 
right. They have this status only in virtue of the way the formula or the 
chart or the instance is used. It is the use that creates the structured context 
within which sign-posts point, series can be continued, orders be obeyed and 
paradigms be exemplary. Only then can we see a particular action as 
embodying or instancing a grammatical structure. In short, the mandatory 
stage setting is social practice. 
Second, community agreement does not constitute a justification for 
particular judgements. What is indispensable for correct, or appropriate, 
judgement and action is that there is concord, not that each individual 
justifies his (or anyone else’s) judgement and action by appeal to its harmony 
with the judgement of others. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
 21 See id. at 169.  
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IV. UNCONSCIOUS RULE-FOLLOWING 
Like Chomsky’s rules of generative grammar,22 
Mikhail’s UMG postulates innate knowledge of a moral 
grammar. This claim makes no sense. How can a child be  
said to “know” moral norms without ever being conscious of 
them? In other words, before a child even learns a syllable of 
language, how can she be said to possess moral knowledge?  
The problem posed by this question cannot be avoided 
by asserting that we “follow” rules “unconsciously.” Again, the 
problem is conceptual.23 “Rule-following” includes a panoply of 
normative activities. When we follow rules we do the following 
things: 
1. Justify our behavior by reference to the rule; 
2. Consult the rule in deciding on a course of conduct; 
3. Correct our behavior and that of others by reference 
to the rule; and 
4. Interpret the rule when we fail to understand what it 
requires. 
It is difficult to see how these normative activities are possible 
when we are unconscious of the existence of the rule. Of course, 
we may act in a manner consistent with a rule. But that is not 
to say that we are following the rule, for to do that would 
require that we do all the things I just mentioned. Thus, 
Mikhail’s claim that a person follows a rule unconsciously is 
untenable. 
V. MIND, MORAL GRAMMAR, AND KNOWLEDGE 
Finally, I come to Mikhail’s most fundamental claim, 
that is, that “the mind contains a moral grammar”24 and that 
  
 22 Generative grammar is a theory of syntax. The grammar takes the form of 
a system of formalized rules which mechanically generate all and only the grammatical 
sentences of a language. See generally NOAM CHOMSKY, ASPECTS OF THE THEORY OF 
SYNTAX 3-10 (1965). 
 23 In the opinion of one careful reader, Chomsky—the inspiration for 
Professor Mikhail’s model of unconscious rule-following—has abandoned the idea. See 
John Searle, End of the Revolution, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Feb. 28, 2002, at 36 (reviewing 
NOAM CHOMSKY, NEW HORIZONS IN THE STUDY OF LANGUAGE AND MIND (2000)) 
(“Chomsky has now given up on the idea that Universal Grammar is a matter of 
unconscious rule-following. But he also dismisses the idea that real human languages 
are governed by rules. That, I believe, cannot be right.”). 
 24 Mikhail, supra note 2, at 144. 
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this grammar is part of “the inherent structure of the mind.”25 
Like all forms of rationalism, Mikhail’s premise is that the 
object of explanation (in this case, moral knowledge) is located 
in a place. In Mikhail’s view, moral knowledge is in the mind. 
This claim is confused because “knowledge” is an ability 
and not a thing. “Know” is a success verb, not a referent.26 To 
“know” something is neither to be in a certain state nor is it to 
be in possession of a particular structure of mind or brain.27 
Like all abilities, the ability to know moral rules is exhibited in 
behavior. Criteria for the ascription of knowledge consist of 
correct performances. “Knowledge” includes, among other 
things, being able to spot error, explain the error, and correct 
it. In doing these things, one demonstrates that one has 
mastered rules—not that one’s mind or brain “contains” the 
rules.28 
Consider: when we say “Jones knows the train schedule 
from Warsaw to Krakow,” we are not saying that Jones has the 
schedule hard-wired into his mind. Even if he did, that would 
still not be sufficient to say that he “knows” the schedule 
because to know the schedule means knowing how to read the 
schedule correctly. To do this, Jones needs to be able to do 
things with the schedule. It is that doing that is the ground of 
the ascription “Jones knows.” Since knowledge is an ability, 
rather than a thing, it cannot be located in the brain, or 
anywhere else for that matter. 
There is also a more fundamental problem with 
Mikhail’s account of UMG, one that goes beyond the confusion 
of an ability with a thing. The problem is that Mikhail thinks 
that the mind is a “place.” In this place, Mikhail locates the 
moral grammar whose “inherent structure” explains our 
behavior. But there is no such place as “the mind.” John Searle 
recently compared thinking with digestion.29 He postulated that 
just as digestion occurs in the stomach, so does consciousness 
  
 25 Id.  
 26 Of course, when we make a decision, many things may cross our mind or 
come to mind. The causal processes for these are varied and many. But none of these 
accompaniments constitutes “thinking” or “deciding.” 
 27 ANTHONY KENNY, THE LEGACY OF WITTGENSTEIN 129 (1984) (“To contain 
information is to be in a certain state, while to know something is to possess a certain 
capacity.”).  
 28 See P.M.S. Hacker, Chomsky’s Problems, 10 LANGUAGE & COMM. 127, 128-
29 (1990).  
 29 See John Searle, Putting Consciousness Back in the Brain: Reply to Bennett 
and Hacker, Philosophical Foundations in Neuroscience, in BENNETT ET AL., supra note 
5, at 97, 108-09. 
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occur in the brain.30 Because we predicate both thinking and 
digesting to persons, these important capacities could each be 
located in a person.  
But the analogy does not hold. If we open someone’s 
stomach, we can see the process of digestion occurring. But if 
we open someone’s brain or mind,31 we do not find anything we 
might call “thinking.”32 Of course, Mikhail’s point could be that 
in order to have knowledge we must first have the necessary 
equipment to make judgments. This is granted but handled by 
the distinction between having an ability and exercising it. The 
normative (“what is thinking?”) cannot be reduced to the causal 
(“what enables us to think?”).33  
The most fundamental problem with Mikhail’s view of 
the nature of mind is that the idea of a moral grammar hard-
wired into the mind is a posit that can never be shown to be 
true. Deeming this posit a hypothesis is to use the language of 
experimentation to support a thesis the truth of which could 
never be shown to be true or false.34 Mikhail’s claims for the 
  
 30 Id. 
 31 Query how one would “open a mind”?  
 32 Of course, an MRI scanner will show that certain areas of the brain are 
actuated when a person is thinking. While the brain is necessary for one to have 
thoughts, the thoughts are not “located” in the brain. See Bennett & Hacker, supra 
note 5, at 143. 
 33 See Hacker, supra note 28, at 134. 
Neurophysiologists may discover that certain neural configurations are 
causally necessary conditions for having the ability to speak a language. But 
they will never find any knowledge in the brain. Neither what one knows, 
namely truths, facts, or propositions, nor abilities to say, show or tell what 
one knows (i.e. abilities constitutive of knowing) can (logically) be found in 
the brain. For truths, facts, and propositions, although they can be 
recorded on paper or on a computer disc, cannot be recorded on or in the 
brain. For whereas we record facts by means of a symbolism, a language, 
and write the information down in a notebook or store it on a computer 
disc, there is no such thing as the brain’s employing a language, 
understanding or speaking a language, nor is there any such thing as human 
beings employing brains as repositories for written records, let alone as 
computer discs. To say that truths, facts, or propositions are stored, filed 
away, or retained in one’s mind is just to say that they are known and not 
forgotten.  
Id. 
 34 Richard Rorty makes the same point with respect to Chomsky: 
Consider, for example, Chomsky’s claim that there is ‘a fixed biologically 
determined function that maps evidence available into acquired knowledge, 
uniformly for all languages’. It is hard to see this as an empirical result, since 
it is hard to think what could disconfirm it. It is uncontroversial that 
organisms that can learn languages have this ability because they have 
different neural layouts than other organisms. The layouts, to be sure, are 
biologically determined. But in what sense can a function be so determined? 
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explanatory efficacy of UMG trade on the language of science 
without delivering scientific results. In short, the arguments 
for UMG confuse two different discourses, those of scientific 
proof and those of speculative metaphysics.  
So, what is “mind”? Mind is the ability to engage in 
linguistic behavior. “Having a mind” is just having a set of 
social skills. Talk of moral grammar is simply an elliptical 
reference to the language of morals, not a state of the mind or 
brain. This is not to minimize moral problems—far from it. It 
is, however, to locate them in their proper place—that is, 
“outside” the mind or brain. 
CONCLUSION 
In this Article, I have defended the claim that there is a 
distinction between the empirical and the conceptual. I have 
made the case that conceptual questions precede empirical 
investigations because without conceptual clarity, nothing of 
sense can follow from experiment. I have used John Mikhail’s 
arguments on behalf of UMG to make the case for the 
distinction between the conceptual and the empirical. The 
issues Mikhail has taken up implicate some of the most basic 
debates in contemporary philosophy. But these contemporary 
debates are a reprise of a much older debate, that between 
rationalism and its critics. The primary issues presented by 
  
To say that a mechanism embodies a function is just to say that its 
behavior can usefully be described in terms of a certain specifiable relation 
between input and output. Nobody can specify any such relation between the 
inputs provided by language-teaching adults and the outputs provided by a 
language-learning child, because they are too various. It would be like 
trying to specify a relation between the events that occur in the course of 
learning to ride a bicycle and those that are the actions of the accomplished 
bicyclist. 
But, Chomsky tells us, there is a function that, rather than mapping inputs 
onto outputs, maps inputs into something called ‘acquired knowledge’. Well, 
the bicyclist too has acquired some knowledge. Should we say that he 
has acquired it thanks to a biologically determined function that maps the 
events of his early, tentative, abortive rides onto a set of internal 
representations whose possession is a necessary condition of his newly 
acquired ability? We could, but what would count as confirming the existence 
of such a mediating entity, in between the learning events and the 
actions which produce successful bicycle rides? 
Richard Rorty, The Brain as Hardware, Culture as Software, 47 INQUIRY 219, 222 
(2004). 
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UMG cannot be resolved through further empirical research.35 
These issues can never be resolved by empirical methods 
because they are, at bottom, philosophical. 
  
 35 Mikhail seems to think otherwise. Mikhail, supra note 2, at 148 (“[F]urther 
research is needed to clarify the relevant conceptual and evidentiary issues.”). 
